Posted Thursday, April 8 2010 at 14:
The impasse over the April 2010 nationwide elections in Sudan signals a new wave of ethnic regionalism — contrasted with regional integration of states — now frightfully sweeping across Africa and rolling back the gains made in democratisation in recent decades.
Pre-election Sudan faces the risk of joining Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and other African states where ethno-regionalism in the context of disputed elections has pushed states to brink of collapse.
The clamour for ethnic-based regional autonomy is linked to the worldwide surge of ethnic nationalism — defined by security theorists as the ‘clash of the peoples,’ everywhere and poised to drive the continent’s politics for generations to come.
Ethnic regionalism has become a divisive force tearing African countries apart: Champions of the Ivorite ideology in Cote d’Ivoire attacked ‘Northerners,’ violently splitting the country into warring North-South regions; in Kenya, crusaders of ethnic-based regionalism have divided citizens into ‘native’ and ‘settlers’ as the basis of ethnic cleansing.
In Sudan, entrenched North-South conflict has deep ethnic, racial and religious fault-lines. Over the years, this divide fed the catastrophic 24-year civil war and now it could mar this month’s polls, scuttling the January 2011 referendum on the independence of the South.
A dispute over the participation by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the 11-13 April election, the first nationwide competitive polls since 1986, is heightening ethno-regionalism and separatist sentiments in the South.
The April elections, delayed since 2008, were originally designed to elect a unity government with the mandate to carry out reforms and make unity attractive for the South. This was to replace the power-sharing government agreed on hurriedly by President Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the John Garang’s SPLM following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. Garang died in July 2005 and was succeeded by Salva Kiir as the President of the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan.
The mid-term election is one of the milestones that the CPA devised to prevent Sudan’s fragile peace from breaking down, including referendum on Southern independence in January 2011 and demarcation of the 1956 North-South border.
But over the years, the South’s relations with Khartoum turned frosty over the rescheduling of the 2008 mid-term election which watered down the original purpose. Ahead of the April elections, SPLM has charged that the electoral process has been flawed long before the first ballot is cast, citing manipulation of census results and voter registration, gerrymandered electoral districts, electoral insecurity, restricted access to media and the right to hold rallies and election laws drafted to favour President Bashir’s party.
As a result, SPLM pulled out its candidate, Yassir Arman, from the presidential race, arguing that the on-going conflict and state of emergency in the war-torn western region of Darfur made it “impossible to have free and fair elections.”
However, the SPLM will contest the parliamentary and municipal elections. It is determined to win at least one-third of the seats in the national legislature to frustrate attempts by al-Bashir’s NCP to unilaterally amend the constitution and undermine the referendum. But the ensuing uncertainty has ignited fears of a return to a third civil war.
Raising the stakes the Khartoum regime, which has kept democracy in cold storage since al-Bashir seized power 21 years ago, threatened to call off the crucial January 2011 referendum. But SPLM chief, Vice-President Salva Kiir, insisted that the referendum “has to be conducted whether there are elections in Sudan or not.”
The ruling NCP badly needs a decisive and legitimate victory in the coming elections. This will guarantee its vision of one undivided Sudan and the safety of President Bashir now facing the threat of extradition to the Hague to stand trial for crimes against humanity in Darfur as the first sitting African Head of State to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The party is fighting to win majority seats in the National Assembly to amend the constitution to enable it to influence the outcome of the January referendum, gain powers to declare a state of emergency in the event of war and maintain stranglehold over the oil-rich region that generates billions of dollars in revenue for the North.
The ensuing North-South conflict set off a flurry of diplomatic initiatives particularly by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union and the international community to halt Sudan’s slide to back to the civil war that claimed some 1.5 million livesExternal initiatives in Sudan are driven by a general fear of election-related violence which has become the bane of democracy in African countries, particularly in Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Kenya.
The level of preparation for elections and implementation of the CPA formed the focus of a recent summit of IGAD’s seven member states in March 2010. The meeting committed to undertake shuttle diplomacy to end mistrust and restore confidence between the elites in the North and South of Sudan and to provide technical support towards realising a free and fair election.
During the meeting, the SPLM leader, Salva Kiir, reiterated that “the Southern Sudan referendum is more important than the upcoming elections scheduled in next April and south will defend it at all cost”.
On its part, the African Union hopes that Sudan will stage free and fair elections in April by adhering to the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). In a March 2010 Agreement, Khartoum promised the African Union that it would uphold these election standards, but as the recent report by the Brussels-based think-tank, the International Crisis Group, Khartoum has already manipulated the electoral process, “resulting in an almost certain victory for the NCP.”
Despite this, the AU has no credible sticks or carrots to ensure that Sudan stages credible elections. In any case, Sudan is not a signatory to the Charter, which has been signed by only 29 countries and ratified by three others: Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Mauritania.
On their part, Western governments and international election observers have called for ‘minor’ postponement of the election to give the Sudan’s National Election Commission (NEC) adequate time to deliver free and fair elections. But Khartoum has ignored this appeal.
Recently, the United States, United Kingdom and Norway censured Khartoum over “continued administrative and logistical challenges, as well as restrictions on political reforms.” They also insisted that it was essential to hold the January 2011 referendum“irrespective of the outcome of [nationwide] elections.” But China, which has vested interests in Sudan’s oil-wealth, is notably mute.
However, Khartoum’s failure to make unity attractive to Southerners has fostered strong ethno-regional sensibilities in the South, making separation inevitable come the 2011 plebiscite. The African Union and the international community have now recognised this fact, but Khartoum is prepared to break every rule in the book to frustrate the referendum.
The NCP regime has covertly supported private militias to destabilise the South, leading to escalation of inter-tribal violence which has killed 450 people and displaced nearly 60,000 others in 2010.
Khartoum’s vigilante war on the South is aided by escalating South-South tensions over unequal access to resources, poor governance and discontent over the dominance of the majority Dinka. This has raised questions of the South’s own stability after the referendum. It is a paradox that ethno-nationalism that defined the South’s quest for self-determination as a region is emerging as the greatest impediment to the stability of a new Southern Sudan state.
Post-referendum arrangements
Ultimately, regional bodies and their international partners should intensify pressure on Khartoum to halt support for militias in the South and step up South-South dialogue to heal the growing divisions between ethnic groups and political elites in the South. They should also halt the arms race between the two parties to the CPA by stemming the sale of arms and the flow of illegal ones to the possible combatants.
Ethno-regionalism is now poised to triumph over the despotic Sudanese state, but negotiations on post-referendum arrangements should now start in order to resolve the North-South boundary problem and the sharing of the oil wealth within the South to prevent the emerging state in Southern Sudan from falling to the same sword of ethnic nationalism.
Peter Kagwanja is the President of the Africa Policy Institute, a Kenyan academic and a Governance consultant. *Thomas Kimaru is the acting Director of the Southern and Central Africa Project of the Africa Policy
Africa Insight is an initiative of the Nation Media Group’s Africa Media Network Project
Friday, April 9, 2010
Monday, March 22, 2010
KENYA: Draft policy offers new hope for IDPs
Internally displaced people (IDPs) in Kenya are set to enjoy greater protection under a national policy that also aims to prevent future displacement and to fulfil the country's obligations under international IDP law, say analysts. The draft policy, unveiled in Nairobi on 17 March, broadens the definition to cover displacement due to political and resource-based conflict and natural disasters, as well as development projects that force people from their homes without proper relocation. The draft policy is a departure from the current approach where "IDP issues are dealt with [on an ad hoc basis], like disasters, without addressing the root causes", Simon Konzolo, a programme officer with Refugee Consortium of Kenya, told IRIN. "If there is displacement, people should be protected, not have a situation where people are being pushed back to places they feel are still not safe. They will stay there for a short time, and run away again. They should be consulted," said Konzolo. History and hate The policy, which emphasizes the criminality of arbitrary displacement, also calls for laws to address historical injustices, such as the national land policy 2009. Land is often at the root of conflict and subsequent displacement. According to experts, the IDP policy will allow for the review of existing laws to deal with impunity. "This is by making sure [displacement] perpetrators are made to account... If you make hate statements that might pit this community against the other that action is taken immediately," said the deputy director of mitigation and resettlement in the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MOSSP), Michael Musembei. The policy also seeks durable solutions for IDPs. "If they were farmers, you assist them to go back to farming. It [the policy] is talking of giving them opportunities," said Musembei. Joined-up legislation According to Fatuma Ibrahim Ali, a commissioner with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the response to the post-election IDP situation was fragmented. "There was a lot of corruption because of the loopholes, the sick in the fields were not accessing hospitals, and women had no reproductive health services," she said. The draft policy, through its institutional framework, gives clear roles to stakeholders; it further proposes the creation of an IDP fund, which experts hope will increase accountability as there will be one kitty from which evolving IDP needs can promptly be met. "The policy's success will depend on its harmonization with other relevant legislation," said Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, an analyst with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). "It cannot be used as a stand-alone document; it has to be harmonized with other legislation, such as government ratification of the AU [African Union] policy, to be effective. There is a need for the government to also put in place a new constitution without delay," Sheekh said. A referendum on a new Kenyan constitution is scheduled for later this year. The draft IDP policy, which will be presented before cabinet later this month, borrows heavily from the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa that obliges governments to recognize IDP vulnerabilities and need for support. Still vulnerable Two years after the post-election violence, tens of thousands of displaced Kenyans remain in squalid conditions in 19 integrated camps, according to MOSSP. The Mawingo camp in Nyahururu, Rift Valley Province, is the most congested with more than 3,000 households. Former IDP households resettled on group land bought by pooling their compensation tokens of at least 10,000 shillings (about US$133) are not faring any better, according to Stephen Mbugua, an IDP leader from Maai Mahiu, in Rift Valley Province. "The problems we have are the lack of health facilities... The other day a child died awaiting treatment. Mobile hospitals are needed," Mbugua, who is in charge of about 1,000 people settled on 14ha of land, told IRIN. Mbugua is aware of the draft IDP policy and expressed cautious optimism. "If this policy passes [into law] it may lessen our problems. The government will have much better knowledge of how to assist us." aw/mw[END]
Monday, March 15, 2010
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (review of 2009 by the US State Department)
In September President Kibaki ordered that approximately 7,000 of the 350,000 persons who fled their homes in Rift Valley Province, Central Province, Nairobi, and other sections of the country as a result of 2008 postelection interethnic violence, still had not been resettled in their home regions. In May 2008 the government announced "Operation Rudi Nyumbani" (Operation Return Home) to return IDPs in camps to their homes; however, the majority of IDPs chose to relocate to transit sites near to their homes. By the end of 2008 the government had closed or ceased providing services to IDP camps; however, the Kenya Red Cross Society reported that 99,198 IDPs resided in transit sites at the beginning of the year. IDP camp residents complained that police used force and did not offer adequate compensation during the resettlement.
Rapes allegedly perpetrated by residents of camps, local residents, and sometimes by police personnel occurred in IDP camps. In May 2008 the representative of the UN secretary-general on the human rights of IDPs visited the country and concluded that the returns of some IDPs were not voluntary and based on informed choices. In an October 2008 report, the KNCHR found that the government had used intimidation and force to remove IDPs from camps and had failed to provide housing, food, and clean water to resettled camp residents. The KNCHR also found that resettled residents were exposed to sexual violence and harassment.
During the year government eviction and destruction of homes in low income areas resulted in IDPs. For instance, in July police bulldozed homes in Githogoro Village, Nairobi, displacing 3,000 residents.
During the year there were many other causes of displacement, including land disputes and flash floods. Throughout the year NGOs reported that hundreds of pastoralists were displaced in conflicts over pasture and watering holes in semiarid regions of North Eastern, Eastern, and Rift Valley provinces. During the year Karamojong from Uganda engaged in cross-border cattle raids in Western Rift Valley Province, resulting in death and displacement among the Pokot and Turkana tribes.
An unknown proportion of the several thousand persons displaced by ethnic clashes from the 1990s had not returned to their homes due to fear of renewed violence.
Rapes allegedly perpetrated by residents of camps, local residents, and sometimes by police personnel occurred in IDP camps. In May 2008 the representative of the UN secretary-general on the human rights of IDPs visited the country and concluded that the returns of some IDPs were not voluntary and based on informed choices. In an October 2008 report, the KNCHR found that the government had used intimidation and force to remove IDPs from camps and had failed to provide housing, food, and clean water to resettled camp residents. The KNCHR also found that resettled residents were exposed to sexual violence and harassment.
During the year government eviction and destruction of homes in low income areas resulted in IDPs. For instance, in July police bulldozed homes in Githogoro Village, Nairobi, displacing 3,000 residents.
During the year there were many other causes of displacement, including land disputes and flash floods. Throughout the year NGOs reported that hundreds of pastoralists were displaced in conflicts over pasture and watering holes in semiarid regions of North Eastern, Eastern, and Rift Valley provinces. During the year Karamojong from Uganda engaged in cross-border cattle raids in Western Rift Valley Province, resulting in death and displacement among the Pokot and Turkana tribes.
An unknown proportion of the several thousand persons displaced by ethnic clashes from the 1990s had not returned to their homes due to fear of renewed violence.
Review of 2009 in Kenya on Protection of Refugees
Report by US Department of State
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa. The country is a signatory of this convention. Its laws minimally provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to some refugees.
The government provided some protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. However, there were reports of forcible returns of Somali asylum seekers throughout the year; the Kenya-Somalia border remained officially closed, preventing asylum seekers from legally entering Kenya. Somali asylum seekers reportedly paid approximately 7,500–15,000 shillings ($100- $200) per family in bribes and transportation costs to travel from the Kenya-Somalia border to the Dadaab refugee camps.
During the year international donors initiated a program to transfer the responsibility of registering all asylum seekers and determining refugee status from the UNHCR to the government. The government also registered refugees in Dadaab camps, located in the northeastern part of the country; however, many refugees had not received their identification documents by year's end.
The government permitted the UNHCR to register and assist new arrivals who successfully made their way to one of the three Dadaab refugee camps. The UNHCR registered more than 59,000 new arrivals in the Dadaab camps between January and the end of November, increasing the camp size to more than 266,000 (the three camps were designed to accommodate 90,000 refugees). In August the UNHCR requested government permission to build a fourth camp in Dadaab due to severe overcrowding; however, as of year's end the government had not responded. Between August and October the International Organization for Migration (IOM) transported more than 13,000 newly arrived Somali refugees from the Dadaab camps to the Kakuma camps to minimize overcrowding.
The UNHCR stopped providing newly arrived refugees with plots in the Dadaab camps, restricting assistance to limited nonfood items (plastic sheeting and cooking utensils) and instructions to locate clan members or search for accommodations in Dadaab refugee camp. Cholera, meningitis, H1N1, and measles outbreaks were all reported in Dadaab. Many new refugees reportedly were bypassing Dadaab camps because of the conditions and continued directly to the Kakuma camp or on to Nairobi.
Despite the policy that all refugees must reside in camps (encampment policy), slightly more than 45,000 refugees were registered in Nairobi as of December; however, the UNHCR provided assistance to these refugees only in exceptional cases. Unofficially, the UNHCR and NGOs estimated that more than 100,000 refugees resided in Nairobi. The government did not provide opportunities for local integration; however, it worked closely with the UNHCR in facilitating refugee resettlement to other countries.
Security concerns, including rape, banditry, and shooting, remained problems at both Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. Health and social workers at the camps reported that due to strong rape awareness programs, victims increasingly reported such incidents, resulting in improved access to counseling. During the year approximately 249 crimes were reported in Kakuma refugee camp, including two homicides and three cases of sexual assault. There were no reported cases of sexual assault by police in either camp. Fifteen relief agencies followed a code of conduct for humanitarian workers to further reduce incidents of sexual abuse by agency staff in refugee camps.
Other security and human rights problems affecting refugees included persecution of Muslim converts to Christianity, community pressure against opponents of female genital mutilation (FGM), forced marriage, particularly of young Sudanese and Somali girls, and family objections to out-of-clan marriage. At times these resulted in the kidnapping of spouses and children. The UNHCR requested increased police presence in the identified troubled areas, as well as increased patrolling within the refugee camps. Additional police were also assigned to the camps but not in sufficient numbers.
There were isolated incidents of interclan violence at the Dadaab refugee camps.
The government required all refugees to remain at UNHCR camps, which were located near the country's borders with Somalia and Sudan, unless refugees had been granted permission to attend higher education institutions, receive specialized medical care outside the camp, or to leave to avoid security threats.
The government introduced mobile courts to serve the camp populations, which were fully fledged judicial courts and instrumental in curbing crime and violence.
The government had not provided temporary protection since 2004 to individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol.
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa. The country is a signatory of this convention. Its laws minimally provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to some refugees.
The government provided some protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. However, there were reports of forcible returns of Somali asylum seekers throughout the year; the Kenya-Somalia border remained officially closed, preventing asylum seekers from legally entering Kenya. Somali asylum seekers reportedly paid approximately 7,500–15,000 shillings ($100- $200) per family in bribes and transportation costs to travel from the Kenya-Somalia border to the Dadaab refugee camps.
During the year international donors initiated a program to transfer the responsibility of registering all asylum seekers and determining refugee status from the UNHCR to the government. The government also registered refugees in Dadaab camps, located in the northeastern part of the country; however, many refugees had not received their identification documents by year's end.
The government permitted the UNHCR to register and assist new arrivals who successfully made their way to one of the three Dadaab refugee camps. The UNHCR registered more than 59,000 new arrivals in the Dadaab camps between January and the end of November, increasing the camp size to more than 266,000 (the three camps were designed to accommodate 90,000 refugees). In August the UNHCR requested government permission to build a fourth camp in Dadaab due to severe overcrowding; however, as of year's end the government had not responded. Between August and October the International Organization for Migration (IOM) transported more than 13,000 newly arrived Somali refugees from the Dadaab camps to the Kakuma camps to minimize overcrowding.
The UNHCR stopped providing newly arrived refugees with plots in the Dadaab camps, restricting assistance to limited nonfood items (plastic sheeting and cooking utensils) and instructions to locate clan members or search for accommodations in Dadaab refugee camp. Cholera, meningitis, H1N1, and measles outbreaks were all reported in Dadaab. Many new refugees reportedly were bypassing Dadaab camps because of the conditions and continued directly to the Kakuma camp or on to Nairobi.
Despite the policy that all refugees must reside in camps (encampment policy), slightly more than 45,000 refugees were registered in Nairobi as of December; however, the UNHCR provided assistance to these refugees only in exceptional cases. Unofficially, the UNHCR and NGOs estimated that more than 100,000 refugees resided in Nairobi. The government did not provide opportunities for local integration; however, it worked closely with the UNHCR in facilitating refugee resettlement to other countries.
Security concerns, including rape, banditry, and shooting, remained problems at both Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. Health and social workers at the camps reported that due to strong rape awareness programs, victims increasingly reported such incidents, resulting in improved access to counseling. During the year approximately 249 crimes were reported in Kakuma refugee camp, including two homicides and three cases of sexual assault. There were no reported cases of sexual assault by police in either camp. Fifteen relief agencies followed a code of conduct for humanitarian workers to further reduce incidents of sexual abuse by agency staff in refugee camps.
Other security and human rights problems affecting refugees included persecution of Muslim converts to Christianity, community pressure against opponents of female genital mutilation (FGM), forced marriage, particularly of young Sudanese and Somali girls, and family objections to out-of-clan marriage. At times these resulted in the kidnapping of spouses and children. The UNHCR requested increased police presence in the identified troubled areas, as well as increased patrolling within the refugee camps. Additional police were also assigned to the camps but not in sufficient numbers.
There were isolated incidents of interclan violence at the Dadaab refugee camps.
The government required all refugees to remain at UNHCR camps, which were located near the country's borders with Somalia and Sudan, unless refugees had been granted permission to attend higher education institutions, receive specialized medical care outside the camp, or to leave to avoid security threats.
The government introduced mobile courts to serve the camp populations, which were fully fledged judicial courts and instrumental in curbing crime and violence.
The government had not provided temporary protection since 2004 to individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol.
Sunday, March 14, 2010
DRC: US, UN accuse forces of "crimes against humanity"
NAIROBI, 12 March 2010 (IRIN) - Government troops - the FARDC - in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are to blame for much of the epidemic of sexual violence in the east of the country, according to US and UN reports detailing war crimes and possible crimes against humanity by various groups there. FARDC is trying to rout the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from the Kivu region and Oriental province in eastern Congo, but operations have been criticized for their impact on civilians. "Armed groups such as the LRA and FDLR commit atrocities that amount to grave breaches of international humanitarian law and, in some instances, may also constitute crimes against humanity," according to the UN experts. "In North Kivu, an assistance provider for victims of sexual violence recorded 3,106 cases between January and July 2009; half of these cases were perpetrated by FARDC members," a group of seven UN experts said in their second report on the situation in DRC, submitted to the Security Council on 8 March. Many of the FARDC troops used to be members of rebel groups who joined the army as part of peace initiatives. In 2009, groups still under arms "continued to commit numerous, serious abuses - some of which may have constituted war crimes - including unlawful killings, disappearances, and torture", according to the US government's annual global human rights report, released on 11 March. The UN experts added arbitrary arrest, forced labour and extortion to this litany of abuses. In Dungu territory of Oriental Province, according to the US-based Enough Project, soldiers committed 116 rapes in a single neighbourhood last October. "A particularly egregious case involved the gang rape of a pregnant woman by five Congolese soldiers near the market of Bangadi on 8 October, 2009," it said.
FARDC commander General Leon Mushale told Enough the problem was isolated: "It is the fault of the man, not of the organization . we are dealing with the problems on a case-by-case basis," he said. "There is a correlation between peace and rape," Bora Kawende, acting head of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) office in North Kivu, recently told IRIN. "During war, soldiers here commit collective, massive rape." Legal gaps The UN experts' report said impunity, absence of the rule of law and women's subordinate social and legal position reinforced a climate of general acceptance and tolerance for violence against women and girls in increasingly militarized societies, such as eastern DRC. "The application of the law is weak," Kawende said. "And if a perpetrator is sentenced, the government must have a good jail where he can stay," she added. In Mbandaka, a soldier was sent to jail for rape, but could not be locked up because the prison had been destroyed during the war. Congo's military justice system, the experts said, had retained jurisdiction over most cases involving serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, but was weak and susceptible to executive interference by military or political decision-makers. "The solution is justice, justice, justice," said Esteban Sacco, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA) in North Kivu. "There has to be a system that brings to justice those who commit the crime of rape." Speaking at a seminar in Goma, North Kivu prosecutor-general Mulumba Kifulya said arrests and prosecutions took too long, and many victims were too poor to pursue cases or preferred to keep quiet. Involving men The charity, Women for Women, called on men to help reduce sexual abuse. "In December, we held a seminar for 550 trainers of trainers, including soldiers, clergy, traditional rulers and local administrators," Clovis Mulungula, sponsorship assistant, told IRIN. "In the seminars, we noticed that some men did not know the consequences."
At least 1.36 million are displaced by violence in the Kivus, according to OCHA. In Hauts Plateaux, Uvira region of South Kivu, thousands of civilians have been trapped by conflict since February, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) said. "We heard from people who have reached our medical structure that there are many civilians who are afraid to come to the hospital," Philippe Havet, MSF's head in DRC noted on 11 March. "They are in constant fear of being attacked." eo/am/mw[END]
FARDC commander General Leon Mushale told Enough the problem was isolated: "It is the fault of the man, not of the organization . we are dealing with the problems on a case-by-case basis," he said. "There is a correlation between peace and rape," Bora Kawende, acting head of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) office in North Kivu, recently told IRIN. "During war, soldiers here commit collective, massive rape." Legal gaps The UN experts' report said impunity, absence of the rule of law and women's subordinate social and legal position reinforced a climate of general acceptance and tolerance for violence against women and girls in increasingly militarized societies, such as eastern DRC. "The application of the law is weak," Kawende said. "And if a perpetrator is sentenced, the government must have a good jail where he can stay," she added. In Mbandaka, a soldier was sent to jail for rape, but could not be locked up because the prison had been destroyed during the war. Congo's military justice system, the experts said, had retained jurisdiction over most cases involving serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, but was weak and susceptible to executive interference by military or political decision-makers. "The solution is justice, justice, justice," said Esteban Sacco, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA) in North Kivu. "There has to be a system that brings to justice those who commit the crime of rape." Speaking at a seminar in Goma, North Kivu prosecutor-general Mulumba Kifulya said arrests and prosecutions took too long, and many victims were too poor to pursue cases or preferred to keep quiet. Involving men The charity, Women for Women, called on men to help reduce sexual abuse. "In December, we held a seminar for 550 trainers of trainers, including soldiers, clergy, traditional rulers and local administrators," Clovis Mulungula, sponsorship assistant, told IRIN. "In the seminars, we noticed that some men did not know the consequences."
At least 1.36 million are displaced by violence in the Kivus, according to OCHA. In Hauts Plateaux, Uvira region of South Kivu, thousands of civilians have been trapped by conflict since February, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) said. "We heard from people who have reached our medical structure that there are many civilians who are afraid to come to the hospital," Philippe Havet, MSF's head in DRC noted on 11 March. "They are in constant fear of being attacked." eo/am/mw[END]
Monday, January 11, 2010
Success of Sudan peace pact requires redoubled efforts by all, Ban says on anniversary
January 2010 – Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon used today's fifth anniversary of the peace pact that ended more than 20 years of civil war in Sudan to urge the parties to redouble their efforts towards reconciliation and the successful completion of remaining benchmarks.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) separatists in the south and the national Government in the north, brought an end to one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars, in which at least 2 million people were killed, 4 million others uprooted and 600,000 more fled across the country's borders.
“During the past five years, considerable progress has been made in the implementation of the CPA and the strengthening of the relationship between the two parties to the agreement,” Mr. Ban noted in a statement issued by his spokesperson.
“However, the final year of the CPA will be an extremely challenging one, especially as the parties prepare for elections and the exercise of the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan,” he added.
He went on to state that these challenges require the parties urgently to establish the necessary legal, political and institutional framework for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections, referenda and popular consultations. It is also important that they engage now in substantive discussions on post-referendum arrangements, regardless of the outcome of the referendum.
“More fundamentally, the parties must work towards reconciliation,” the statement added.
“The people of Sudan have witnessed the horrible consequences of war and have waited more than 20 years for the benefits of peace. If the CPA is to deliver this peace, it will require a substantially increased commitment by the parties, with the support of the international community.”
In a report issued last October, Mr. Ban stated that the key to implementing the CPA is the relationship between its signatories. “The Agreement must be implemented in spirit as well as the letter if the immense work undertaken is to be sustainable,” he stressed, calling on the sides to boost their cooperation.
Today's statement declared that support for the successful implementation of the CPA is one of the UN's top priorities for this year, and that the world body will work closely with all actors to help the parties meet the final benchmarks of the peace agreement.
The 10,000-strong UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has been in place since 2005 to help the parties implement the accord.
The Mission today voiced concern over the escalating violence in Southern Sudan over the past couple of weeks, in which more than 150 people have reportedly been killed and many more injured and displaced.
UNMIS chief Ashraf Qazi commended the actions taken so far by the Government of Southern Sudan, and urged it to investigate the incidents and to redouble its efforts to help de-escalate the rising wave of violence in the region.
For its part, the Mission has dispatched a long range military patrol to help defuse tensions and reduce chances of reprisal attacks at the site of the clashes, as well as to prepare for the arrival of humanitarian assessment teams.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) separatists in the south and the national Government in the north, brought an end to one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars, in which at least 2 million people were killed, 4 million others uprooted and 600,000 more fled across the country's borders.
“During the past five years, considerable progress has been made in the implementation of the CPA and the strengthening of the relationship between the two parties to the agreement,” Mr. Ban noted in a statement issued by his spokesperson.
“However, the final year of the CPA will be an extremely challenging one, especially as the parties prepare for elections and the exercise of the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan,” he added.
He went on to state that these challenges require the parties urgently to establish the necessary legal, political and institutional framework for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections, referenda and popular consultations. It is also important that they engage now in substantive discussions on post-referendum arrangements, regardless of the outcome of the referendum.
“More fundamentally, the parties must work towards reconciliation,” the statement added.
“The people of Sudan have witnessed the horrible consequences of war and have waited more than 20 years for the benefits of peace. If the CPA is to deliver this peace, it will require a substantially increased commitment by the parties, with the support of the international community.”
In a report issued last October, Mr. Ban stated that the key to implementing the CPA is the relationship between its signatories. “The Agreement must be implemented in spirit as well as the letter if the immense work undertaken is to be sustainable,” he stressed, calling on the sides to boost their cooperation.
Today's statement declared that support for the successful implementation of the CPA is one of the UN's top priorities for this year, and that the world body will work closely with all actors to help the parties meet the final benchmarks of the peace agreement.
The 10,000-strong UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has been in place since 2005 to help the parties implement the accord.
The Mission today voiced concern over the escalating violence in Southern Sudan over the past couple of weeks, in which more than 150 people have reportedly been killed and many more injured and displaced.
UNMIS chief Ashraf Qazi commended the actions taken so far by the Government of Southern Sudan, and urged it to investigate the incidents and to redouble its efforts to help de-escalate the rising wave of violence in the region.
For its part, the Mission has dispatched a long range military patrol to help defuse tensions and reduce chances of reprisal attacks at the site of the clashes, as well as to prepare for the arrival of humanitarian assessment teams.
Africa
In 2001, a summit of African leaders adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as the continent’s overall plan for long-term economic, social and political development. The chief executive officer of the Secretariat of NEPAD is Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, a former prime minister of Niger, who actively took up his post in April. In this exclusive interview with Africa Renewal, Mr. Mayaki discusses NEPAD’s progress so far — and the challenges that lie ahead for the African Union’s development programme.
You attended the September 2009 meeting of the Group of 20 (G-20) in Pittsburg, which was called to further respond to the global economic crisis. Were any of Africa’s specific concerns addressed?
One of Africa’s priorities is agriculture. That priority is widely accepted by the international community, because agriculture is seen as the main entry point for poverty reduction. For quite a long time, that was not the case. But given that the majority of African populations live in rural areas and their main activity is agriculture, most experts and non-experts have come to the conclusion that if we want to boost their revenues, we should go for agricultural development. That was reaffirmed in Pittsburg. One of the conclusions there was to give a mandate to the World Bank to establish a multidonor trust fund specifically dedicated to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which was conceived by NEPAD and adopted by the African Union. Pittsburg also reaffirmed the commitment of the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting at L’Aquila [Italy, in July], establishing a mechanism for financing agriculture. In L’Aquila, the targeted volume of resources was $20 bn. So the commitments are there. Now the challenge is to channel the resources for the implementation of CAADP.
Before the current economic crisis, Africa was hit by a sharp rise in food prices. There were protests, and considerable suffering. Was that a wake-up call for African governments, to put more of their own resources into agriculture and the food sector?
African heads of state had already decided to fix a target of 10 per cent of public resource allocation to the sector. To tell the truth, that target has not been very well attained. Most countries which are close to the target have quite good political stability and have been managed well by democratically elected governments. Generally, a sound agricultural policy is produced by good government systems and politically stable institutions.
When we look at the food riots which took place in the last two years, what do the police reports say? They say that most of the people who participated in these riots were under 20, unemployed, from rural areas and did not belong to any political party or trade union. This youth — and 50 per cent of our population is under 20 — is the key factor which will determine the future of our economies, our political institutions and our government systems. The issue is very simple: Either African governments tackle that youth employment issue through agriculture and rural development, and stabilize their institutions. Or they don’t, and then they will be sitting on a political bomb.
NEPAD argues that good political governance is vital for Africa’s development more generally. And one of the means developed by NEPAD to improve governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism. How is the APRM doing?
The APRM is quite an original approach. It is based on the voluntary participation of governments that decide to open themselves to a review by their peers. Transparency is a key element for the credibility of the exercise. You see more and more countries deciding to volunteer. Institutionally, the APRM has a secretariat that is different from the NEPAD Secretariat, and is constituted by a panel of independent personalities. The challenge is: How do we use the conclusions and recommendations of the review exercises? Normally, the countries are the ones who are supposed to implement the recommendations. But we know that they need support in terms of capacity. It is the main constraint to implementation. I think we could work on capacity development issues, and gather the resources and partners to tackle that dimension.
Would it be correct to say that when you talk about countries’ capacities for implementing the peer review recommendations, it’s not just the capacities of governments, but also of civil society, parliaments, the media and so on?
Absolutely. You can have the best public institutions, but if you don’t have sound citizenship, then your probability of developing in a democratic way is very limited. The roles of civil society organizations and the private sector are key for building the overall institutions.
Building up Africa’s physical infrastructure — roads, power systems, harbours, communications networks — is one of NEPAD’s priorities. But infrastructure is a very expensive undertaking. How has the current world financial crisis affected NEPAD’s plans for attracting more investment for infrastructure?
The financial crisis has transformed itself into an economic crisis. It has had an impact on resource allocation to the African continent. Given that infrastructure projects need quite important amounts of resources, we’ll evidently face challenges in that sector.
But I think it is an opportunity also to better mobilize our domestic resources. Some countries have been good at it, some of us, not really. Africa has domestic resources which are now going to Europe, the US and so on. I’ll just give two figures. The food import bill of Africa is around $40 bn. If we had sound agriculture policies and invested just some of that amount, we could even be exporting food. Capital flight out of Africa is around $30 bn. Out of that $30 bn, almost $20 bn is the consequence of corruption. So we must look more thoroughly at mobilizing the domestic resources that we do have.
We often hear arguments in Africa by civil society groups, academics and others that NEPAD is a fine-sounding plan, but we don’t see much evidence of it on the ground. Why does NEPAD seem to be moving so slowly?
NEPAD, as a programme, is still very relevant to the development challenges that the continent is facing. It is a comprehensive programme, based on two main values. One is the value of ownership, that we have to design by ourselves our own development programmes. The second dimension is to foster economic integration as a way of developing at a faster pace. These two dimensions inspire the sectoral priorities that are being designed. We worked closely with the African Union Commission to create the CAADP. In science and technology, we have created networks of excellence throughout the continent. In our information and technology department, we have launched the e-schools initiative, which is working quite well. We have supported the department of social affairs of the African Union Commission with our advice on health polices. So a lot has been done.
Between the birth of NEPAD in 2001 and now, I would say this has been an experimental process. And like all experimental processes, you have had ups and downs. Certainly, we have not communicated sufficiently on the ups, and we let other people communicate on the downs. But from that good experimental process, let us build a new NEPAD. We are going to be transforming into the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, with the main objective of facilitating implementation of key projects derived from the continental policies designed by the African Union Commission.
The international community has supported NEPAD since its inception. But when the integration decision was taken [to bring NEPAD more closely into the structures of the African Union], there was a certain period of uncertainty on what was exactly going to happen, structurally and functionally. So it was understandable that the international community would wait to see what was going to happen. Now that support has to be reinvigorated. The integration is good for two reasons. The first one is that it will erase the overlaps which were existing before, and the contradictions. And second, it will send a positive signal to the international community on how to deal with each of us, the African Union Commission and the NEPAD agency.
As for the African countries, it is our job to demonstrate to them what we can do. We have to tell them what our role is, what the roadmap on which we want to work is and how we cooperate with the regional economic communities. And then they will see what we are able to deliver. The challenge we face as an institution is a crucial one. Now we have really to deliver very concretely on the ground. It’s on the basis of our delivery that we have to be judged.
Early on, NEPAD was identified with several of its more prominent advocates, who worked closely with the G-8 donor countries. But some of those presidents are no longer in office. With NEPAD now being integrated more closely into the African Union, do you see a new stage of trying to build broader political responsibility for NEPAD within Africa?
The push given by those leaders was absolutely essential. Otherwise NEPAD would not have been seen as important as it is. Now we are in a phase of opening up to broader ownership, so it becomes owned by the 53 countries of the African Union. This means we have to communicate on that, we have to be present more widely and we have to deliver very concretely in all the regions.
There seems to be an interesting parallel process under way with Africa’s international partners. NEPAD initially focused on interacting with the G-8. But now the main international economic forum will be the G-20, a wider group that includes some of the emerging economies, China, India, Brazil and so on. What’s the significance of that for Africa?
We can sense what is going to happen, but we don’t really know what is going to happen. Effectively, the shift from the G-8 to the G-20 is the result of the increasing weight of the emerging economies, which have a direct impact on any global decisions. The existence of the G-20 is a positive structural adaptation to a new reality. In that new reality, Africa clearly has to think in a very wise and intelligent manner. Our role should not be minimized within that new process. And we should try to use the members that we have within the G-20 to really speak in the name of Africa.
NEPAD is present, with the African Union, at the meetings of the G-20. We make sure that the messages which are conveyed are in coherence with NEPAD. What we are seeing on the African side is a more coherent and single African voice. As you know, in Copenhagen [the international climate change conference] Africa will have a single voice, a unique coordinator of the African Group, a unique negotiation strategy. In the times to come, Africa will function more and more with such a single voice.
— Africa Renewal
You attended the September 2009 meeting of the Group of 20 (G-20) in Pittsburg, which was called to further respond to the global economic crisis. Were any of Africa’s specific concerns addressed?
One of Africa’s priorities is agriculture. That priority is widely accepted by the international community, because agriculture is seen as the main entry point for poverty reduction. For quite a long time, that was not the case. But given that the majority of African populations live in rural areas and their main activity is agriculture, most experts and non-experts have come to the conclusion that if we want to boost their revenues, we should go for agricultural development. That was reaffirmed in Pittsburg. One of the conclusions there was to give a mandate to the World Bank to establish a multidonor trust fund specifically dedicated to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which was conceived by NEPAD and adopted by the African Union. Pittsburg also reaffirmed the commitment of the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting at L’Aquila [Italy, in July], establishing a mechanism for financing agriculture. In L’Aquila, the targeted volume of resources was $20 bn. So the commitments are there. Now the challenge is to channel the resources for the implementation of CAADP.
Before the current economic crisis, Africa was hit by a sharp rise in food prices. There were protests, and considerable suffering. Was that a wake-up call for African governments, to put more of their own resources into agriculture and the food sector?
African heads of state had already decided to fix a target of 10 per cent of public resource allocation to the sector. To tell the truth, that target has not been very well attained. Most countries which are close to the target have quite good political stability and have been managed well by democratically elected governments. Generally, a sound agricultural policy is produced by good government systems and politically stable institutions.
When we look at the food riots which took place in the last two years, what do the police reports say? They say that most of the people who participated in these riots were under 20, unemployed, from rural areas and did not belong to any political party or trade union. This youth — and 50 per cent of our population is under 20 — is the key factor which will determine the future of our economies, our political institutions and our government systems. The issue is very simple: Either African governments tackle that youth employment issue through agriculture and rural development, and stabilize their institutions. Or they don’t, and then they will be sitting on a political bomb.
NEPAD argues that good political governance is vital for Africa’s development more generally. And one of the means developed by NEPAD to improve governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism. How is the APRM doing?
The APRM is quite an original approach. It is based on the voluntary participation of governments that decide to open themselves to a review by their peers. Transparency is a key element for the credibility of the exercise. You see more and more countries deciding to volunteer. Institutionally, the APRM has a secretariat that is different from the NEPAD Secretariat, and is constituted by a panel of independent personalities. The challenge is: How do we use the conclusions and recommendations of the review exercises? Normally, the countries are the ones who are supposed to implement the recommendations. But we know that they need support in terms of capacity. It is the main constraint to implementation. I think we could work on capacity development issues, and gather the resources and partners to tackle that dimension.
Would it be correct to say that when you talk about countries’ capacities for implementing the peer review recommendations, it’s not just the capacities of governments, but also of civil society, parliaments, the media and so on?
Absolutely. You can have the best public institutions, but if you don’t have sound citizenship, then your probability of developing in a democratic way is very limited. The roles of civil society organizations and the private sector are key for building the overall institutions.
Building up Africa’s physical infrastructure — roads, power systems, harbours, communications networks — is one of NEPAD’s priorities. But infrastructure is a very expensive undertaking. How has the current world financial crisis affected NEPAD’s plans for attracting more investment for infrastructure?
The financial crisis has transformed itself into an economic crisis. It has had an impact on resource allocation to the African continent. Given that infrastructure projects need quite important amounts of resources, we’ll evidently face challenges in that sector.
But I think it is an opportunity also to better mobilize our domestic resources. Some countries have been good at it, some of us, not really. Africa has domestic resources which are now going to Europe, the US and so on. I’ll just give two figures. The food import bill of Africa is around $40 bn. If we had sound agriculture policies and invested just some of that amount, we could even be exporting food. Capital flight out of Africa is around $30 bn. Out of that $30 bn, almost $20 bn is the consequence of corruption. So we must look more thoroughly at mobilizing the domestic resources that we do have.
We often hear arguments in Africa by civil society groups, academics and others that NEPAD is a fine-sounding plan, but we don’t see much evidence of it on the ground. Why does NEPAD seem to be moving so slowly?
NEPAD, as a programme, is still very relevant to the development challenges that the continent is facing. It is a comprehensive programme, based on two main values. One is the value of ownership, that we have to design by ourselves our own development programmes. The second dimension is to foster economic integration as a way of developing at a faster pace. These two dimensions inspire the sectoral priorities that are being designed. We worked closely with the African Union Commission to create the CAADP. In science and technology, we have created networks of excellence throughout the continent. In our information and technology department, we have launched the e-schools initiative, which is working quite well. We have supported the department of social affairs of the African Union Commission with our advice on health polices. So a lot has been done.
Between the birth of NEPAD in 2001 and now, I would say this has been an experimental process. And like all experimental processes, you have had ups and downs. Certainly, we have not communicated sufficiently on the ups, and we let other people communicate on the downs. But from that good experimental process, let us build a new NEPAD. We are going to be transforming into the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, with the main objective of facilitating implementation of key projects derived from the continental policies designed by the African Union Commission.
The international community has supported NEPAD since its inception. But when the integration decision was taken [to bring NEPAD more closely into the structures of the African Union], there was a certain period of uncertainty on what was exactly going to happen, structurally and functionally. So it was understandable that the international community would wait to see what was going to happen. Now that support has to be reinvigorated. The integration is good for two reasons. The first one is that it will erase the overlaps which were existing before, and the contradictions. And second, it will send a positive signal to the international community on how to deal with each of us, the African Union Commission and the NEPAD agency.
As for the African countries, it is our job to demonstrate to them what we can do. We have to tell them what our role is, what the roadmap on which we want to work is and how we cooperate with the regional economic communities. And then they will see what we are able to deliver. The challenge we face as an institution is a crucial one. Now we have really to deliver very concretely on the ground. It’s on the basis of our delivery that we have to be judged.
Early on, NEPAD was identified with several of its more prominent advocates, who worked closely with the G-8 donor countries. But some of those presidents are no longer in office. With NEPAD now being integrated more closely into the African Union, do you see a new stage of trying to build broader political responsibility for NEPAD within Africa?
The push given by those leaders was absolutely essential. Otherwise NEPAD would not have been seen as important as it is. Now we are in a phase of opening up to broader ownership, so it becomes owned by the 53 countries of the African Union. This means we have to communicate on that, we have to be present more widely and we have to deliver very concretely in all the regions.
There seems to be an interesting parallel process under way with Africa’s international partners. NEPAD initially focused on interacting with the G-8. But now the main international economic forum will be the G-20, a wider group that includes some of the emerging economies, China, India, Brazil and so on. What’s the significance of that for Africa?
We can sense what is going to happen, but we don’t really know what is going to happen. Effectively, the shift from the G-8 to the G-20 is the result of the increasing weight of the emerging economies, which have a direct impact on any global decisions. The existence of the G-20 is a positive structural adaptation to a new reality. In that new reality, Africa clearly has to think in a very wise and intelligent manner. Our role should not be minimized within that new process. And we should try to use the members that we have within the G-20 to really speak in the name of Africa.
NEPAD is present, with the African Union, at the meetings of the G-20. We make sure that the messages which are conveyed are in coherence with NEPAD. What we are seeing on the African side is a more coherent and single African voice. As you know, in Copenhagen [the international climate change conference] Africa will have a single voice, a unique coordinator of the African Group, a unique negotiation strategy. In the times to come, Africa will function more and more with such a single voice.
— Africa Renewal
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