Vision 2030 fuel conflict in Isiolo Northern Kenya

NAIROBI, 25 November 2011 (IRIN) - Pre-election politics and planned development schemes have fuelled an upsurge in inter-communal killings and forced displacement in Kenya's northern Isiolo area, which if left unaddressed, is likely to escalate, say analysts and civil society workers.

Several communities have been caught up in the unrest but the main protagonists are the Borana and Turkana ethnic groups. Recent events indicate the standard interpretation of the conflict being limited to tit-for-tat cattle rustling and drought-related resource conflict is superficial and outdated.

Isiolo features prominently in a major national development plan known as Vision 2030 [ http://www.vision2030.go.ke ] , whereby the town is set to be elevated to a "resort city", complete with up-market hotels and a new airport to boost its tourism potential, rooted in nearby game-parks.

A road linking Isiolo to Moyale, which lies on the Ethiopian border, is being built while oil and gas exploration is under way in the wider Isiolo region.

"Organized" attacks

Since mid-October, seemingly organized attacks have claimed about 20 lives, including those of seven children, and led to the displacement of some 2,900 households, according to humanitarian sources and local officials.

Livestock was not stolen in most of these incidents but dozens of dwellings were set ablaze. Most of the targeted settlements are inhabited by Turkana people. Continuing insecurity has greatly hampered humanitarian response to the displaced, who in many cases fled so quickly they had no time to take any possessions, and whose plight is worsened by the onset of heavy rains.

There is also a "desperate need" for shelter and non-food items such as mosquito nets, kitchen kits, jerry cans, soap, blankets and sleeping mats, according to the findings of a mission to Isiolo conducted by UNICEF, adding that the lack of latrines in displacement sites had resulted in sickness and worries about more cases.

"The Isiolo conflict is political: this is driven by the 2012 election," said a researcher, who asked not to be named because of the tension. "Certain communities are being incited by sitting politicians who are eyeing the new county positions like governorship, senatorship and parliamentary seats."

Kenya's new constitution created 47 new counties to help devolve political and economic power.

"These conflicts are to inflict fear and displace the so-called minority communities in Isiolo," he said.

"In the absence of appropriate security measures and law-enforcement interventions aimed at preventing future clashes and inter-ethnic violence, there is a real risk that the situation could deteriorate significantly in the lead-up to the 2012 elections," UNICEF said in its mission report.

Leaders of various communities - Somali, Samburu, Gabra and Rendille as well as Turkana and Borana - told IRIN they blamed the escalation of violence on the failure of local authorities to address the root causes of the unrest.

"The police and army have not and will never resolve disputes among the locals," said Joseph Kalapata of the Forum for the Protection of Pastoralist Development.

"Our people should be informed that they all lose conflicts. They also need to understand that he current constitution guarantees equal sharing of resources," he added.

Some leaders also pointed to the failure of a disarmament operation in 2010 to rid some pastoralist communities of all of their weapons. There are plans to renew the exercise in December.

Economic conflict

The Borana are the largest and politically dominant ethnic group in Isiolo. Drought in 2011 led to an influx of large numbers of pastoralists from various groups. Isiolo's economic growth has also served as a magnet.

In the 2007 general election, the local parliamentary seat was won by a Borana, with a Turkana coming a close second.

"These conflicts are being used by the Borana to suppress their future political and economic competitors like the Turkana and Somalis," said the researcher.

The conflict is about "political numbers, not resources, because civilians, including women and children are being killed and nothing stolen", he said.

"How do you kill a small child and shoot a pregnant woman? Why should you kill people at two in the morning, shoot people while they are still sleeping? These are the questions we need to ask ourselves," said an Isiolo-based civil society worker.

Displaced

"As we are talking, many Turkana have run away from their homes, it is really a pity," said the civil society worker. "The Turkana also happen to be in quite a number of places where these developments will be."

"Let the truth be told, the Turkana are holding large swathes of land to the detriment of other communities," a senior member of Isiolo county council was reported as telling a recent meeting convened to discuss deteriorating security.

The Turkana are mainly located in the outskirts of Isiolo town.

"There are five major communities in Isiolo which are all fighting for recognition. All of them think that they have a stake, leading to misunderstandings and the formation of alliances that have led to the loss of lives," the civil society worker said.

"We want people to go back to normality with no more deaths. This kind of organized intimidation has to stop," he said.

According to local sources who spoke to IRIN, a lack of clear land tenure policy has helped fuel conflict in the area as tracts earmarked for development are taken over, or "grabbed", by people keen to cash in on Vision 2030.

Another source of tension is private game parks, known as "conservancies", tourist destinations also designed to reduce poaching and promote community development. The Borana and Somali communities feel excluded from the economic benefits they deliver as well as their rich pastureland.

According to a priest in Isiolo, Jeremia Ndungu: "The great concern is how to broker peace among the communities who are unequal in matters of resources."

Mama Kapua, a Turkana mother-of-12, fled her home in the Isiolo suburb of Kambi Garba after it was attacked on 22 October. Her husband, who stayed behind with one of their sons, died when the house was set on fire. The son escaped with burns.

"They [the attackers] are bringing in people from outside Isiolo who cannot speak Kiswahili. They are here to fight," she told IRIN.

"My husband had nothing valuable worth being killed for. My son was preparing for exams," she said, explaining that she managed to escape with the help of an ethnic Somali neighbour who lent her a niqab as a disguise.

Eritrea: Aiding Terror?

By Francis Mureithi

On November 1^st, 2011, Kenya accused Eritrea of shipping heavy artillery and explosives to Somalia to arm the Al Shabaab.

Kenya military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir, in a briefing statement stated: "We reliably confirmed that two aircrafts landed in Baidoa with arms consignment intended for Al Shabaab." Chirchir did not name Eritrea as the source of the weapons. However, internet sources including the Somalia Report, an internet based newsletter, reported that Eritrea flew in arms through Baidoa airport on Saturday.

Somalia MP Mahamud Abdullah Wehliye was quoted as accusing Eritrea of flying in weapons and explosives to Al Shabaab controlled Baidoa. “Eritrea officers have imported ... many modern weapons, including heavy artillery, bombs, light weapons and heavy ones. We got this information from Al Shabab officers in Baidoa”, the MP is quoted as saying. “The Eritrean government is adding fuel to the worsening situation in Somalia. They are giving support to ... Al Shabaab. We request the United Nations and the internal community to step in,” he added.

The newsletter quoted residents as saying that the Al Shabaab closed the area around the airport to allow in the shipments on Saturday. “After three hours, I saw more than ten vehicles coming from the airport to a building in the centre of the district," said the report.

In his briefing statement, Chirchir cautioned Somalia residents against being used as conduits for the arms. He cited several areas in the region which were targeted for attack as they were Al Shabaab camps. Addressing an Inter Governmental Authority on Development (Igad) meeting last July, President Kibaki accused Eritrea of arming the Al Shabaab insurgents. He asked Igad to rein in Eritrea, which was destabilising regional peace through supplying arms to Somali militants.

Did kenya's claim hold much water? To answer this question, ponder on this:-

On 4 July 2011, IGAD held its 18th Extra-ordinary Summit in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, which focused on the situation in Somali and the activities of the State of Eritrea in aiding extremist and subversive groups to destabilize the region. The Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, basing his address on the reports of the Eritrea Somalia Monitoring Group (ESMG), fully briefed the summit on the destabilizing activities of Eritrea not only in Somalia but also in the entire region. Since 2002, the Somalia Monitoring Group has investigated the role of the Eritrean regime in destabilizing Somalia. Its reports reveal that in the May-November 2006 hiatus, the Eritrean regime used dhows, vessels and leased aircraft to transport weapons to Somalia. This effectively subverted the efforts of the African Union and the United Nations to restore peace and stability in one of Africa‘s war-ton failed states. Driven by geo-political rivalries, religious and ideological differences, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt supported Eritrea to supply arms and train extremist groups. In December 2009, following revelations of its activities in support of terror networks, the UNSC imposed targeted sanctions on Eritrea. On 10 March 2010 the Security Council expanded the mandate of the Monitoring Group to cover ―oversight of the arms embargo on Eritrea and the designation of individuals subjected to a travel ban and asset freeze for violations.‖ The group was renamed Eritrea Somalia Monitoring Group (ESMG), highlighting the critical role of Eritrea in destabilizing Somalia.

Sample this:

Table 1: Eritrea’s support of Somali extremists, May-November 2006

DATE	SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
6 May 2006	An Eritrean military aircraft–Antonov – delivers a shipment of anti-aircraft guns.
15 June 2006	Four Eritrean military aircrafts delivers in Somalia assorted arms including AK 47 assault rifles, PKM (machine guns), RPG launchers, a variety of ammunition and military uniforms.
4 July 2006	Four Eritrean military aircrafts transport to Mogadishu arms for the Council of Islamic Courts (ICU) and roughly 500 military personnel consisting of Eritrean military and fighters from the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF.
15 July 2006	A senior Eritrean military officer, Colonel Yusuf Negash Warque, conducts meetings with leaders of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts including from both the Executive Committee and the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee).
20 July 2006	An Airbus A-310-300, operated by Daallo Airlines, departed from Assab, Eritrea, destined for Somalia carrying B-10 anti-tank guns; heavy (large calibre) machine guns; PKM machine guns, with magazines and telescopic sighting devices; AK47 assault rifles; G3A3 assault rifles; Browning .30 calibre machine guns; 120mm mortars and rifle fired grenades.
21 July 2006	A second arms shipment, consisting primarily of a variety of ammunition, arrived in Somalia onboard an Airbus A310-300 – also operated by Daallo Airlines.
23 July 2006	A commercial aircraft departs from the UAE empty and flew to Eritrea where it picks up and delivers a shipment of arms for the ICU, including shoulder fired surface to air missiles and second generation, 50 units of infrared-guided anti-tank weapons; 100 units of RPG; 540 units of AK 47 assault rifles; 94 units of FAL assault rifles; 106 units PKM machine guns; unknown units of ZU-23 and DShK anti-aircraft

ammunition; foodstuffs, water supplies and medicines.
24 July 2006	An Eritrean aircraft transports to Mogadishu‘s Esaley Airport a senior Eritrean military officer and unspecified quantities of rockets and other anti-tank weapons.
26 July 2006	An Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) carrying 10 senior Eritrean military officers departs from Assab, Eritrea and delivers assault rifles, hand grenades, mines, PKM machine guns, LAWs, surface to air missiles, multiple rocket launchers, different calibres anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns, military uniforms, machine gun belts (feeder belts) and medicines for the ICU at Mogadishu International airport.
27 July 2006	Some 500 ICU fighters are flown from Easley Airport, Mogadishu, to Eritrea for training on the use of the new types of rockets and surface to air missiles, 200 of these receives training in Eritrea in guerrilla warfare while 100 are sent to Libya and 200 to Syria.
28 July 2006	Two IL-76 cargo aircrafts leaves Eritrea and delivers shipments of anti-tank weapons; ZP-39 anti-aircraft guns with seats; 80 extra barrels for the ZP-39; boxes of ammunition for ZP-39; DShK heavy machine guns and boxes of ammunition; PKM and boxes of ammunition; AK 47 and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the AK 47; mines; FAL assault rifles and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the FAL assault rifle; SAR-80 assault rifles; anti-personnel mines; B-10 anti-tank guns and boxes of ammunition; and 60mm mortars and boxes of ammunition.
8 August 2006	An Eritrean military aircraft transports 300 fighters of the ICU from Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle Region to Eritrea for military training on the use of rockets and surface to air missiles and offloads shipments of AK47 assault rifles and PKM machine gun ammunition.
End August 2006,	A large military transport aircraft transports a shipment of arms from Eritrea including M-46 130mm towed field gun, D-30 122 towed howitzer, M-30 122mm towed howitzer, D-30 152mm , ZU 57-2-57mm , Zu-23-2, Shilka-4-23mm, Zu-23-4, different calibers of mortars, SA-6 ‗Gainful‘ Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile, surface to air missiles PZRK Strela2M aka SA-7 ‗Grail‘, RPG-7.
8 October 2006	A B-707 aircraft takes off from Massawa, Eritrea to Mogadishu International Airport delivering generators, medicines, 2500 single person tents and 30 larger tents, 400 pieces of telecommunication equipment for vehicles, 1500 communications handsets and 10 sealed containers intended for the ICU military forces in Raskiambooni, Guriel, Mogadishu and Kismaayo.
10 October 2006	The B-707 aircraft transports unknown quantity of arms and representatives of an ICU military force returning to Somalia from military training.

Source: Selected Reports of the Monitoring Group and the Panel of Experts on Somalia Submitted Through the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia 2006-2010, available at:http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml.

A holistic look: How the ICC process shapes transitional justice in Kenya

Sep 19, 2011 05:19 pm by Thomas Obel Hansen

Dear readers – the following article is written by Thomas Obel Hansen, who holds a PhD in transitional justice and is an Assistant Professor with the United States International University in Nairobi, Kenya. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the blogger.

Ruti Teitel, a leading transitional justice scholar, once noted, “In the public imagination, transitional justice is commonly linked with punishment and the trials of ancient regimes.” While it is true that transitional justice in Kenya has predominantly been debated as a question of criminal justice, however, the accountability process does not target members of an ancient regime but rather members of a political class still in power. These factors are important to keep in mind when analyzing how the International Criminal Court (ICC) process influences other mechanisms of transitional justice in the country.

Following the ICC prosecutor’s naming of the six Kenyan suspects in December 2010, the government launched a number of initiatives with the common purpose of bringing to an end the ICC process. One such move concerned diplomatic efforts aimed at making the United Nations Security Council use its mandate under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to order a (temporary) stop to the ICC proceedings.

In support of the deferral request, government officials stated that because “some of the individuals mentioned by the ICC prosecutor are among the front runner presidential candidates and the civil servants mentioned are in office and charged with responsibilities for peace and security,” the ICC process poses “a real and present danger to the exercise of government and the management of peace and security in the country.”

Paradoxically, the government at the same time declared that a domestic accountability process was under way under the auspices of a reformed judiciary, thus implying that criminal justice for the post-election violence would indeed be laudable.

The existence of a domestic accountability process is in principle irrelevant for a UN Security Council deferral, but it would pose a relevant argument in connection to another attempt made by the government to end the ICC process, namely the admissibility challenge filed earlier this year.

Though this admissibility challenge has now been rejected by the Appeals Chamber, the government’s action has ramifications for the reform agenda, which should be seen as a crucial pillar of transitional justice in Kenya.

As a consequence of the perceived linkage to ending the ICC process, political leaders opposed to ICC intervention – many of them known supporters of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, who are both ICC suspects – have advocated strongly for the implementation of judicial reforms. Ephraim Maina, the Central Kenya MPs Association chairman, stated the intentions clearly: “We must now concentrate on enacting laws that will lead to creation of a tenable judicial mechanism and ensure it is in place by September when the Six return to The Hague. With this, the country will be able to argue for a deferral and transfer of the case home.”

While of course not the sole consequence of their connection to the ICC process, judicial reforms in Kenya have in fact seen some important progress recently, including the adoption of some crucial bills and the appointment of a new chief justice, Willy Mutunga, who is generally seen as a “pro-reformer.”

Somewhat ironically, the opposition to accountability principles has thus turned out to be a driver of the selfsame principles.

Yet, ICC intervention – or perhaps more precisely, the controversy that has surrounded the process – seems in other ways to constitute an obstacle to the reform process initiated with the adoption of a new constitution in August last year. As noted by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, which was instrumental in finding a solution to the political crisis surrounding the post-election violence and continues to monitor the reform process in Kenya, “the personalisation and politicisation of the ICC process had obscured dialogue on reforms that would prevent future violence and the need to find justice for the victims, including IDPs”.

To put it in simpler terms, the drama surrounding the ICC process has had the unfortunate consequence that an increasingly divided political leadership has all too often neglected other important aspects of transitional justice in Kenya, including devolution, security sector reforms, land reforms, and other structural change envisaged in the 2010 constitution.

Similarly, the ICC’s intervention seems to have had mixed consequences for the level of attention paid to the victims of the post-election violence.

Despite the fact that international law requires states to provide victims of gross human rights violations with various forms of reparation, including compensation, the Kenyan government has failed to offer compensation to the victims of the violence. Additionally, many victims struggle to get the medical care they need and a significant proportion of those displaced as a result of the violence continue to live in dire conditions in camps for internally displaced.

In some ways, the ICC has proven an obstacle for remedying this situation. By targeting prominent politicians and other powerful individuals, the ICC has contributed to escalating the divide between political factions, seemingly making it increasingly difficult to find solutions to problems such as displacement. Furthermore, commenting on the ICC process, the media and others have tended to focus on the perpetrator side as opposed to the victim side.

Notwithstanding that this problem is also reflected in the discourses surrounding the ongoing confirmation hearings, as discussed in an earlier article , the hearings may eventually turn out to promote a broader debate about victims and their rights. The hearings may ultimately increase awareness in the general public concerning the needs and rights of victims because the Rome Statute allows victims, through their legal representative to participate in the hearings, to make statements and question witnesses. This in turn may add pressure on the government to fulfill its international obligations.

Another mechanism of transitional justice that may benefit victims and society in general concerns the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The commission was established in the wake of the 2008 violence, but it is mandated to investigate and address human rights abuses and other forms of injustices taking place ever since independence.

However, the TJRC has experienced significant challenges fulfilling its mandate, a problem that again seems related to the overwhelming focus on the ICC process and the political context in which transitional justice in Kenya unfolds.

Evident, for example, from problems of obtaining the necessary funding and the appointment of a chairperson with a dubious record, there has been limited support at the level of the political leadership for creating a strong and independent commission. Although some of these challenges have now been remedied and the commission has finally commenced its hearings, there are widespread concerns that the TJRC may fail to deliver.

That the TJRC is facing such problems might seem incongruous given that key elements of the government have on various occasions argued that Kenya should follow the example of South Africa by prioritizing reconciliation over retribution; that the TJRC should be a substitute, not a supplement, to a criminal justice process. Whereas debates about the most appropriate form of justice can of course be legitimate, it seems as if some decision-makers’ support for the TJRC was inspired by other narrow interests, such as shielding from justice members of the selfsame political elites.

With this in mind, it seems doubtful whether the ICC process will generate increased acceptance of the TJRC, at least at the level of the political leadership.

Some of the same considerations are relevant when attempting to understand why a local accountability process is yet to be established.

As the Kenyan parliament rejected a number of proposed bills to establish a local tribunal, many MPs instead called for “The Hague Route,” explaining that their opposition to a national accountability process was grounded in due process concerns. Surely, such concerns could have sounded legitimate if not for the fact that the parliament – with only one MP opposing – subsequently passed a motion calling for the government to withdraw from the Rome Statute.

This illustrates how the debate about accountability, to some extent captured by political elites, has been framed around a perceived (but misconceived) dichotomy between local and international justice; as a matter of international or national trials, rather than both.

With the failure of the admissibility challenge and the commencement of the confirmation hearings, it seems increasingly clear that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to secure political commitment for putting in place a framework for national trials. In other words, the progress of international justice seems to have consequences for the prospects of national justice, but not necessarily positive ones as many had hoped.

This takes us back to where we started. Transitional justice in Kenya does not target an “ancient regime” but rather takes place in a context where there has arguably been no fundamental political transition. This presents a serious, sometimes insurmountable, challenge to establishing credible mechanisms at the national level. Turned around, some of the tools that have nonetheless been utilized may prove decisive for promoting that such a transition eventually takes place in the country. The ICC process is important in this regard because it is harder for Kenya’s political elites to manipulate its operations due to its external nature, but also because it may serve important objectives on its own. However, is also vital – and vital to understand – that the court shapes other transitional justice mechanisms, albeit admittedly not always in a positive manner.

Drone warfare won't win in Libya

Unmanned aerial combat vehicles, better known as Predator or Reaper drones, are sleek, small, flexible planes that look like gliders. They have capabilities that larger, heavier manned jet aircraft do not possess.

Drones are cheaper to use than planes. If they are shot down, no U.S. pilot is killed or captured. And because they are unmanned, President Barack Obama uses them in places where, for political reasons, he does not want a significant U.S. military presence.

Yet that is the fatal attraction of drones -- they may not seem like a weapon of war but they are.

On Friday, CNN reported that the United States had begun using combat drones in Libya. CNN also reported that a drone attack in Pakistan had killed at least 25 people -- a third of them women and children.

As this death toll demonstrates, drones are battlefield weapons. Predators and Reapers launch Hellfire missiles or drop bombs weighing up to 500 pounds -- firepower only permitted in armed conflict. The United States is not in an armed conflict in Pakistan; it is not supposed to be in one in Libya.

In Pakistan, despite continuous drone attacks since 2004, the terrorism threat remains. In 2010, the United States attacked more than 110 times, killing 600 to 700 people. Greg Miller of The Washington Post has reported that in all of those strikes only two people on a list of high-level terrorism suspects were killed.

Top counterterrorism experts from the Rand Corp. to the Obama administration have said the use of military force, which includes combat drones, is counterproductive to the goal of ending terrorist groups. Bob Woodward revealed in his book, "Obama's Wars," that the president knows this:

"Despite the CIA's love affair with unmanned aerial vehicles such as Predators, Obama understood with increasing clarity that the United States would not get a lasting, durable effect with drone attacks."
Pakistanis protest U.S. drone action
RELATED TOPICS

* Drone Attacks
* Libya
* Barack Obama
* Moammar Gadhafi
* Terrorism

What U.S. drone policy in Pakistan has managed to accomplish is the increasing alienation of Pakistani authorities and the Pakistani people. The one thing the U.S. does need to counter terrorism is friends.

Opinion: U.S.-led drone war is self-defeating

Drones are likely to be just as ineffective in Libya. The official U.S. aim there is civilian protection. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17 says the use of "all necessary measures" is authorized "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in" Libya.

The resolution responded to the imminent rout of Libyan rebels from Benghazi, and the fear that Libyan armed forces would exact revenge on civilians left behind. The resolution did not authorize outside intervention in a civil war. Indeed, an earlier resolution, Resolution 1970, imposes a weapons embargo on all of Libya. Resolution 1973 continues that embargo with an exception to establish a "no-fly" zone and take other steps to protect civilians.

After defending Benghazi, the U.S. should have turned immediately to seeking a peaceful end of the crisis. The U.S. rejected out of hand the African Union peace initiative, thereby putting no pressure on the rebels to come to the table. Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron instead took the new position that Moammar Gadhafi must go as a condition of ending the use of force.

In this case, such a position is unlikely to help the cause of peace -- it only backs Gadhafi further into a corner. Each day the war continues, civilians are killed or die as a result of the fighting. Just as the fighting seemed to settle into a stalemate that could only be broken by negotiations at last -- the drones arrive. Their deployment appears set to move the conflict even further from a peaceful settlement. Even if the unlikely occurs and Gadhafi and his sons leave or are killed, continued fighting or chaos are predictable.

Perhaps the U.S. aim is not primarily civilian protection but regime change? If so, drone attacks will be no more helpful to that aim than to civilian protection. Air attacks can keep the rebels in the fight but cannot win the war for them. A civil war can only be won by control of territory, not control of the air.

Controlling territory requires military and civilian leadership, organization, training and equipment to defeat the Libyan army and replace the government. The rebels have deficits in all of these categories. Even if air attacks could buy NATO time to try to organize and train the rebels, Resolution 1970 does not permit arming the rebels.

Sending drones to Libya is unlikely to bring the rebels a military victory. Drones are likely to prolong the fighting and the deaths of civilians. Sending drones does not even help Obama keep his promise that NATO would take the lead. Drones controlled by the U.S. deploy major military force.

Drones give the appearance of a sophisticated, high-tech policy, not involving a big U.S. military presence. What they really give us is death and destruction that will not lead to the end of terrorism in Pakistan -- or peace in Libya.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Mary Ellen O'Connell।

Editor's note: Mary Ellen O'Connell holds the Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law and is research professor of international dispute resolution at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. She is a specialist on the international law of armed conflict and is the author of "The Power and Purpose of International Law" (Oxford University Press, 2008). She has been a professional military educator for the U.S. Department of Defense, chaired the Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association (2005-2010) and is a vice president of the American Society of International Law.

(CNN)

Six non-obvious points about conflict, security and development

Launched today, the 2011 World Development Report is on “Conflict, Security and Development.” In making a presentation on its relevance to Africa to my World Bank colleagues, I counted six messages that are new and different.

1. 21st century violence is different from 20th century violence.
2. Conflict and violence are caused by a combination of weak institutions and external stresses.
3. Build good-enough coalitions to break the cycle of repeated violence.
4. Create jobs, even with second-best approaches that are inefficient and likely not sustainable.
5. Address external stresses alongside institution building.
6. International partners should do more good than harm.

More on each on them:

1. 21st century violence is different from 20th century violence. The former is characterized by repeated cycles of conflict and violence. Political violence in apartheid-era South Africa was followed by criminal violence, conflict in Guinea-Bissau by drug-trafficking-related violence. These cycles mean that the economies of some fragile states are caught in a low-level equilibrium trap.

2. Conflict and violence are caused by a combination of weak institutions and external stresses. While this may seem obvious, it suggests an economic model of violent conflict that I haven’t seen before. The decision to engage in violent conflict has a type “collective action” problem associated with it. The cost to any individual in taking up arms is lower the greater is the number of other people taking up arms. But you don’t always know who else is going to join the fight. What external stresses, such as food price spikes, natural disasters or widespread drug trafficking, do is provide a “focal point”—information that everybody receives—to solve this collective action problem.

3. Build good-enough coalitions to break the cycle of repeated violence.This means going against our instincts in divided societies to have a “big tent” and bring everybody under it. You may need to exclude some groups, as Colombia did, in order to get enough of a coalition that restores confidence in collective action.

4. Create jobs, even with second-best approaches that are inefficient and likely not sustainable. For instance, public works schemes are often very costly ways of creating employment, but using demobilized soldiers to rebuild roads in Liberia helped both the demobilization and infrastructure goals.

5. Address external stresses alongside institution building. There may be a special role for the international community here, because some of these stresses—such as terms of trade shocks or drug trafficking—are the result of factors outside the fragile states themselves.

6. International partners should do more good than harm. This may sound like a platitude, but it’s worth repeating because too often we may be doing the opposite. The problem is that external partners don’t sufficiently distinguish between fragile and non-fragile states. For instance, we provide budget support to both types of countries. In the latter, the aid is intended to stimulate growth and poverty reduction through policy and institutional reforms. In the former, it is essentially “life support”—to pay civil servants’ salaries and reduce the chances of a resumption of conflict. The criteria should not be the same. Likewise, the total volume of aid is typically conditioned on performance; but if these countries are caught in a low-level equilibrium trap, perhaps aid should also be conditioned on “need”—so that they can emerge from the trap.

UN Office Highlights Concerns Over TFG

GBAGBO MUST HAND OVER POWER TO OUATTARA

THE AU REITERATES ITS URGENT CALL TO MR. LAURENT GBAGBO TO IMMEDIATELY हैण्डOVER POWER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, MR। ALASSANE DRAMANE OUATTAR
Addis Ababa, 1 April 2011: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU),
Dr. Jean Ping, follows closely the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire, marked by military
operations conducted under the authority of the internationally‐recognized President of the
Republic in order to consolidate legality on the entire Ivorian territory.
The Chairperson of the Commission recalls the efforts made by the AU, in close cooperation
with ECOWAS, the United Nations and other partners, to find a peaceful solution to the
crisis that broke out in the aftermath of the second round of the presidential election of 28
November 2010, on the basis of strict respect for the will of Ivorians who have chosen Mr.
Alassane Dramane Ouattara as the President of the Republic. In particular, these efforts
culminated in the proposals made by the AU High‐Level Panel for the Resolution of the Crisis
in Côte d'Ivoire, endorsed on 10 March 2011 by the 265th meeting of the AU Peace and
Security Council (PSC), held at the level of Heads of State and Government, which, at the
same time, directed that negotiations be convened between the Ivorian parties to agree on
the modalities for the implementation of these proposals.
The Chairperson of the Commission deeply regrets that the refusal by the outgoing
President, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, to accept these proposals, to which President Ouattara has
formally adhered to, as well as his rejection of all other initiatives aimed at ending the crisis,
have not made it possible to speedily complete the implementation of a peaceful solution to
the crisis that would have spared the Ivoirians the additional suffering being visited upon
them today. He urges Mr. Gbagbo to immediately hand over power to President Alassane
Dramane Ouattara, in order to shorten the suffering of the Ivorians.
On its part, the African Union will continue, in close coordination with ECOWAS and other
partners, to work with the President of the Republic, Mr. Alassane Ouattara, and other
stakeholders, to promote genuine national reconciliation among all Ivorians, the deepening
of democracy and the consolidation of peace.
The Chairperson of the Commission reiterates the imperative of protecting the civilian
population and the obligations of all parties in this respect, as provided for by international
humanitarian law, including access of humanitarian actors to civilian populations in need.
He encourages UNOCI, within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security
Council, in particular resolution 1975 (2011), to vigorously implement its mandate to protect
civilians.